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【案例】已贴网站 国际前沿 | 《伦理学与社会哲学》第22卷第一期文章摘要 本期“国际前沿”栏目为大家分享Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy （《伦理学与社会哲学》）第22卷第一期文章的目录、摘要及其中文翻译。《伦理学与社会哲学》是一本道德、社会、政治和法哲学领域的在线期刊。 目录 Law and Violence 法律与暴力 Moral Decision Guides: Counsels of Morality or Counsels of Rationality? 道德决策的指导准则：道德建议还是理性建议？ What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment? 对于执法圈套的不一致批评是什么？ The Equivalence of Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism 平等主义和优先主义的等价性 The Limits of Instrumental Proceduralism 工具程序主义的限制 Discussion Notes: Constrained Fairness in Distribution 讨论笔记：分配中的有限公平 Law and Violence 法律和暴力 作 者：Alexander Guerrero, Rutgers University 摘 要：The law marks a significant difference between violent and non-violent criminal actions. Violent crimes are typically met with more severe punishments and consequences than non-violent crimes. Even in discussions of criminal justice reform, the refrain remains: violent crime is different; those convicted of violent crimes are different; and it is appropriate to respond to violent crime differently. This article argues that the violent/non-violent distinction cannot bear the normative weight placed on it and that we should jettison violence and move to thinking about objectionable harm caused and risked. There are moral constraints on punishment from considerations of proportionality and equality, these are connected to wrongful harm and facts about agent culpability, and there is no consistent relationship between violence and wrongful harm nor between violence and culpability. The article concludes by offering an error-theory concerning our commitment to treating violent crime differently and suggests that morally better categorizations are available. 法律标志着暴力和非暴力犯罪行为之间的重要区别。暴力犯罪通常比非暴力犯罪受到更严厉的惩罚和后果。即使在关于刑事司法改革的讨论中，也有这样一句话：暴力犯罪是不同的；那些被判暴力犯罪的人是不同的；以不同方式对待暴力犯罪是适当的。本文认为，暴力/非暴力的区别不能承载对其施加的规范性分量，我们应该抛弃暴力，转而考虑已经造成和可能造成的令人不快的伤害。从相称性和平等的角度考虑，对惩罚存在道德限制，这些限制与不当伤害和行为人罪责的事实有关，而在暴力和不当伤害之间以及暴力和罪责之间不存在一致关联。文章最后提出了一个关于我们致力于区别对待暴力犯罪的错误论解释，并表明道德上可以进行更好的分类。 Moral Decision Guides: Counsels of Morality or Counsels of Rationality? 道德决策的指导准则：道德建议还是理性建议？ 作 者：Holly M. Smith, Rutgers University 摘 要：In a two-tiered, or Dual Oughts, moral theory, the objective account of right and wrong is supplemented by decision guides (such as “Maximize expected value”) designed to enable an agent, uncertain about the circumstances or consequences of her possible actions, to indirectly apply the objective theory by using an appropriate decision guide. But are the decision guides counsels of morality or counsels of rationality? Peter Graham argues they are counsels of pragmatic rationality. This paper shows Graham’s view is unsuccessful, and argues, based on the approach recently developed in [Author] that decision guides must be seen as moral principles. An explanation is provided for why we may be tempted to interpret decision guides as principles of rationality. 在双层道德理论或双重道德理论中，对错的客观描述由决策指导准则（如“最大化期望值”）进行补充，这种决策指导准则旨在使行动者在不确定其可能行为的境况或后果的时候，能够通过使用适当的决策指导准则间接地应用客观理论。但是，这一决策指导准则是道德建议还是理性建议？彼得·格雷厄姆(Peter Graham)认为，它们是实用理性的建议。本文表明格雷厄姆的观点并不成功的，并主张根据[作者]最近提出的方法，决策指导准则必须被视为道德准则。本文解释了为什么我们可能会倾向于将决策指南解释为理性准则。 What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment? 对于执法圈套的不一致批评是什么？ 作 者：Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod, University of Liverpool；Attila Tanyi, The Arctic University of Norway 摘 要：Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts that, in attempting to entrap, law-enforcement agents lapse into a form of practical incoherence that involves the attempt simultaneously to pursue contrary ends. We then argue that the objection, in this form, encompasses all cases of legal entrapment only if it is supplemented by appeal to the premise that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty never to create crimes. 一些法律理论家认为，执法圈套（钓鱼执法）是不连贯的。到目前为止，文献中还没有关于这种反对意见的令人满意的准确表述，甚至连据称其所涉及的不连贯的类型也很模糊。（也许因此，对这种反对意见的实质性评价也不存在。) 我们的目的是提供一种关于该反对意见的、比此前表述更准确严谨的新表述。我们认为，这种反对意见的最佳形式是断言：在试图实施执法圈套时，执法人员陷入一种实践不连贯性，包含同时追求相反目的的尝试。继而，我们认为，只有当执法人员有不制造犯罪的绝对义务这一前提得到补充，这种形式的反对意见才能够包含所有执法圈套案件。 The Equivalence of Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism 平等主义和优先主义的等价性 作 者：Karin Enflo, Stockholm University 摘 要：In this essay I argue that even though egalitarianism and prioritarianism are different theories of social welfare, they can use the same social welfare measures. I present six different arguments for this thesis. The first argument is that conceptual connections between egalitarianism and prioritarianism ensure that any measure that works for either theory works for both. The second argument is that conditions necessary and sufficient to identify egalitarian and prioritarian measures, respectively, are equivalent. The third argument is that both egalitarianism and prioritarianism can use two standard measures, typically proposed for only one theory. The fourth to sixth arguments contend that four properties that have been proposed as distinctive of either egalitarian or prioritarian measures cannot distinguish between them. I conclude that any egalitarian measure is also a prioritarian measure, and vice versa. 在这篇文章中，我认为，即使平等主义和优先主义是不同的社会福利理论，他们也可以使用相同的社会福利措施。我为这个论点提出了六个不同的论证。第一个论证是，平等主义和优先主义之间的概念关联确保了任何对二者中某一理论有效的措施对两者都有效。第二个论证是，用于确认平等主义和优先主义的措施的充分必要条件，都各自相同。第三个论证是，平等主义和优先主义都可以使用两个标准措施，这些措施通常只为单个理论提出。第四到第六个论证认为，被认为是平等主义或优先主义衡量标准的四个特征无法区分二者。我的结论是，任何平等主义的措施也是优先主义的措施，反之亦然。 The Limits of Instrumental Proceduralism 工具程序主义的限制 作 者：Jake Monaghan, University of New Orleans 摘 要：According to instrumental proceduralism, political power is justified when it is the output of a reliable procedure. In this paper, I examine how procedures are supposed to confer normative properties. Based on this assessment, I conclude that many proceduralists set the reliability bar too low. Next, I motivate two additional requirements for instrumental procedures. I introduce the notion of “predictable” procedural failure and argue that in order for a procedure to confer legitimacy or other normative properties on its output, it must not have failed predictably. Finally, I argue that even when procedures are highly reliable, it must not be the case that their failures fall disproportionately on certain people. The goal is to develop an instrumental proceduralism that is more sensitive to the failures of real institutions. 根据工具程序主义，当一个政治权力是可靠程序的产物时，它是正当的。在本文中，我考察了程序应该如何赋予规范属性。基于这一考察，我的结论是，许多程序主义制定的可靠标准过低。然后，我提出两个对工具性程序的额外要求。我引入“可预测的”失败程序的概念，并主张为了使一个程序能够赋予其产物合法性或其他规范属性，它必须没有可预测的失败。最后，我认为即使在程序高度可靠时，也决不会在特定人群身上出现不成比例的失败。我的目标是发展出一种对现实制度失败更为敏感的工具程序主义。 Discussion Notes Constrained Fairness in Distribution 分配中的有限公平 作 者：Daniel Hausman, University of Wisconsin, Madison 摘 要：In “Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries: Scarcity, Overlap Cases, and Fair Inequalities of Chance”, Gerard Vong addresses intriguing problems in which it is impossible to give an equal chance of receiving a good to a set of equal claimants, because goods can be distributed only via groups which have overlapping membership. Vong proposes a rule for distributing chances that he argues is sensitive to both comparative and absolute fairness. This comment discusses some formal difficulties with Vong’s proposal and argues that it is better to separate the two concerns and to allow the tradeoffs between them to depend on characteristics of the goods to be distributed. 在《权衡加权抽彩:稀缺性、重叠情况和公平的机会不平等》一书中，Gerard Vong提出了一个有趣的问题，即不可能给一组平等的要求者以平等的机会获得益品，因为益品只能通过具有成员共叠性的群体进行分配。Vong提出了一个分配机会的规则，他认为这个规则对相对公平和绝对公平都具敏感性。本篇书评讨论了Vong的提议的一些形式困难，并认为最好将这两个问题分开，并允许它们之间的权衡取决于被分配的益品的特性。 来源：中国伦理在线（公众号） 链接：https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/IrNrUM4G3GLHRKbvAq2Izg 编辑：屈妍君
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楼主: 刘海明
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