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龚鹏程对话海外学者第一百三十八期：在后现代情境中，被技术统治的人类社会，只有强化交谈、重建沟通伦理，才能获得文化新生的力量。这不是谁的理论，而是每个人都应实践的活动。龚鹏程先生遊走世界，并曾主持过“世界汉学研究中心”。我们会陆续推出“龚鹏程对话海外学者”系列文章，请他对话一些学界有意义的灵魂。范围不局限于汉学，会涉及多种学科。以期深山长谷之水，四面而出。
爱德华·哈考特教授（Professor Edward Harcourt）
牛津大学的哲学教授，曾担任加州大学伯克利分校的研究员和因斯布鲁克大学的维特根斯坦研究教授。 龚鹏程：您好。关于伦理学和心灵哲学之间的界限，您是怎么看的？ 爱德华·哈考特：龚教授，您好。不多! 说真的，在某些地方，边界是牢固的，因为显然有一些伦理学的领域不涉及心灵哲学。元伦理学，即道德思想和谈话的形而上学、语义学和认识论，就是一个例子（也是一个明显值得研究的领域）。 然而，在伦理学的其他领域，我对如何与心灵哲学划清界限不太有信心。一个是美德。如果我们知道我们对"道德美德 "中的 "道德 "的确切含义，我们可以自信地说对道德美德的探究属于伦理学，而把对所有其他人类倾向（冒险、好奇心、害羞、亚里士多德的 "伟大"）的探究分配到其他地方——包括心灵哲学。但我不认为我们对 "道德美德 "中的 "道德 "有什么了解。 另一个领域是其他思想的问题。了解他人所想所感的能力是一种心理上的成就，还是一种道德上的成就？这个问题很快就变得复杂了——例如，一个人可以可靠地知道别人在想什么和感觉，而不关心它吗？那些声称无法分辨的"精神病患者 "是邪恶的，还是只是有病？ 我再补充一个例子，这也许更有争议性。从表面上看，心灵的形而上学——心灵和身体之间的关系——完全属于心灵哲学的范畴。但是，尽管这一领域的争论是以哲学家一贯的谨慎和精确进行的，但这些争论是由关于人类和我们在自然界中的位置的对应所见所引导的（在我看来），这些所见——无论是我们不过是一捆捆的原子，还是有形的人的概念先于"心灵 "或 "身体"——都是人们生存的依据。 哲学家们在做这些事情的时候可能不会称其为'伦理学'，但对这些所见的争论是伦理学的争论，就像自由主义与保守主义的争论、功利主义与对手的争论等等一样。 Not much! Seriously, in some places the boundary is solid because there are obviously some areas of ethics that don't involve philosophy of mind. Meta-ethics, i.e. the metaphysics, semantics and epistemology of moral thought and talk, is an example (and also an area of inquiry clearly worth pursuing). However, there are other areas of ethics where I am less confident about where to draw the boundary with philosophy of mind. One is the virtues. If we knew exactly what we meant by the ‘moral’ in ‘moral virtue’, we could confidently say the inquiry into the moral virtues belongs to ethics while assigning the inquiry into all other human dispositions (adventurousness, curiosity, shyness, Aristotle’s ‘magnificence’) somewhere else – including the philosophy of mind. But I don't think we have the faintest idea what we mean by the ‘moral’ in ‘moral virtue’. Another area is the problem of other minds. Is the capacity to know what others are thinking and feeling a psychological achievement, or a moral one? The question rapidly gets complicated – for instance, can one reliably tell what others are thinking and feeling without caring about it? Are ‘psychopaths’, who allegedly can’t tell this, wicked or just ill? I’ll add one more example, which is perhaps more controversial. On the face of it, the metaphysics of mind – the relation between the mental and the physical - belongs squarely in the philosophy of mind. But though arguments in this area are pursued with philosophers’ usual care and precision, these arguments are led (it seems to me) by rival visions of humanity and of our place in nature, visions – whether that we are nothing but bundles of atoms, or that the concept of the embodied human being is prior to either ‘mind’ or ‘body’ - which are the kinds of things people live by. Philosophers may not call all this ‘ethics’ when they are doing it, but quarrels over such visions are ethical quarrels no less than quarrels over liberalism vs conservatism, utilitarianism vs its rivals, and so on. 龚鹏程：新亚里士多德主义目前的趋势如何？ 爱德华·哈考特：几年前，"美德伦理学 "这个词出现了，它是由那些认为道德哲学的唯一问题是 "我在道德上有义务做什么 "的哲学家提出来的——在范式上，结果主义就是为了回答这个问题的。这些人认为，任何对美德感兴趣的人都必须试图从美德的概念中提取一个与之相对应的答案。 事实上，正是对这个问题的价值的怀疑，吸引了少数哲学家去研究亚里士多德的遗产。现在不幸的是，有一些亚里士多德的信徒确实在试图从美德的概念中提取对后果主义者问题的答案。这就是您在学校教科书中看到的"美德伦理学"，这是新亚里士多德主义的一个趋势，但我不认为这是非常有成效的。 幸运的是，还有两个我认为更有趣的趋势。第一个例子是最近新亚里士多德主义的大量实证性工作：美德是如何获得的？它们与其他心理倾向的关系是什么？它们是如何聚集的？发展心理学可以帮助我们填补亚里士多德的答案。 还有很多东西需要发现，我们需要用比目前流行的"亲社会行为 "更清晰的概念来对待这些实证调查，而新亚里士多德的哲学家们可以在这方面提供帮助。 其次，在菲利帕·福特之后，还有新亚里士多德的自然主义。 就我个人而言，我对我们熟悉的基督教后的美德目录是否真的是人类社会生活所需要的表示怀疑，部分原因是任何一套单一的特征发挥这种作用的想法低估了劳动分工的重要性——一个成功的社会似乎需要不同的人做不同的事，包括（可能）一些传统的恶习。我再次认为将实证和哲学联系起来会有帮助，这将是未来几年的一个多产的研究领域。 Some years ago, the phrase ‘virtue ethics’ came on the scene, introduced by philosophers who thought the only question in moral philosophy is ‘what am I morally obliged to do?’ – the question that consequentialism, paradigmatically, is designed to answer. Those people assumed that anyone interested in the virtues must be trying to extract a rival answer to it from the concept of virtue. In fact it was precisely scepticism about the value of that question which drew a minority of philosophers to Aristotle’s legacy. Now unfortunately there are devotees of Aristotle who really are trying to extract an answer to the consequentialist’s question from the concept of virtue. That’s what you will find under ‘virtue ethics’ if you look in a school textbook and it’s one trend in neo-Aristotelianism, but one I don't think is very fruitful. Fortunately there are two other trends which I think are more interesting. The first is exemplified by the volume of recent empirical work of neo-Aristotelian inspiration: how are the virtues acquired? What is their relationship to other psychological dispositions? How do they cluster? Developmental psychology can help us to fill out Aristotle’s answers. There is plenty more to discover, and we need to approach these empirical investigations equipped with much sharper concepts than for example the currently fashionable ‘prosocial behaviour’, and neo-Aristotelian philosophers can help with that. Secondly, there’s neo-Aristotelian naturalism in the wake of Philippa Foot. Personally I am sceptical that the familiar post-Christian catalogue of virtues really are what we need for human social life, in part because the idea of any single set of characteristics playing that role underestimates the importance of the division of labour – a successful society seems to require different things from different people, including (possibly) some traditional vices. Again I think linking the empirical and the philosophical can help, and this will be a fertile field of research for years to come. 龚鹏程：尼采在精神疾病方面的的哲学论述，只是他个人的，还是在精神分析学界和医疗体系中起著作用？ 爱德华·哈考特：关于精神分析，可以说弗洛伊德是欠了尼采的债的，例如，他认为我们有意识的精神生活只是一个更大的冰山的一角；还有两位哲学家对精神力量（驱动力）的重视；以及我们的天性意味着我们不可能同时繁荣和满足文明的要求的想法（尽管我认为弗洛伊德在这方面比尼采更悲观，因为尼采思考的是没有道德可能是什么样子，而弗洛伊德没有）。 但是我没有看到这种尼采的债务在英国当代精神分析思想中发挥了多大的作用——它可能在拉康存在感更强的精神分析亚文化中更为突出。而且我认为尼采在英国更广泛的医学体系中的作用确实是非常边缘化的。 On psychoanalysis, arguably Freud has a significant debt to Nietzsche, for example in the thought that our conscious mental life is just the tip of a much larger iceberg; in the importance both philosophers assign to psychic forces (‘drives’); and in the thought that our natures mean we are unlikely both to flourish and to fulfil the demands of civilization (though I think Freud was if anything more deeply pessimistic about this than Nietzsche, because Nietzsche thinks about what it might be like to do without at least morality, whereas Freud doesn't). But I don't see this Nietzschean debt playing much of a part in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking in the UK – it may be more prominent in psychoanalytic subcultures where Lacan is a bigger presence. And I think Nietzsche’s role in the wider medical system in the UK is very marginal indeed. 龚鹏程：您关心道德心理学、写《道德、反思与意识形态》等等，有针对我们这个时代的理由吗？
爱德华·哈考特：关于道德心理学，我不知道该说什么——我从未想过“道德心理学：必须研究这个！"。它只是总结许多（虽然不是全部）吸引我注意的各种哲学问题的最佳术语。 但我很高兴您提到《道德、反思与意识形态》。意识形态的概念，以及相关的虚假意识的概念，仍然很少受到'分析性'哲学家的关注，也许近年来比在'分析性马克思主义'的全盛时期还要少。这是一个遗憾，因为这些概念所提出的一些问题也会出现在那些属于道德哲学主流的概念和理论中。 一个例子是两级后果主义，在这种情况下，大多数人被设想为不知道最终的后果主义理由，这是由于他们看似非后果主义的实践思维模式造成的；另一个例子是在元伦理学中，在道德（也许我应该说是后道德）思维的错误理论重建中。 在这两种情况下，挑战在于一个特定的思维模式能否在对我们为什么这样想的理论解释的认识中幸存下来。但这非常接近于我们为一种思想模式提出的挑战，就是我们把它暴露为意识形态的时候。 在《道德、反思与意识形态》中，我们的想法是要说明同样的挑战是如何出现在哲学的一些看似不相干的领域中的，希望这样做能帮助我们在所有这些领域中取得进展：我们能否对思想模式的解释说一些一般性的东西，使我们能够说思想模式何时能在对解释的认识中幸存下来，何时不能？ 虽然这套书在当时没有产生什么影响，但我怀疑这些问题会重新流行起来——当然我自己也希望能回到这些问题上。 On moral psychology, I’m not sure what to say – I never thought ‘moral psychology: must study that!’. It’s just the best term to sum up many (though not all) the various philosophical issues that have captured my attention. But I’m pleased you mentioned Morality, Reflection and Ideology. The concept of ideology, and the related concept of false consciousness, have still received very little attention from ‘analytic’ philosophers and perhaps even less in recent years than they did in the heyday of ‘analytical Marxism’. That’s a pity, because some questions raised by these concepts also arise for concepts and theories that are very much part of the mainstream of moral philosophy. One example is two-level consequentialism, in which most people are envisaged as unaware of the ultimately consequentialist justification for their seemingly non-consequentialist modes of practical thought; another is in metaethics, in the error-theoretic reconstruction of moral (perhaps I should say post-moral) thinking. In both cases the challenge is whether a given mode of thought can survive awareness of what, according to the theory, explains why we think that way. But that’s very close to the challenge we raise for a mode of thought when we expose it as ideological. In Morality, Reflection and Ideology the idea was to show how the same sort of challenge arises in a number of seemingly disparate areas of philosophy, in the hope that doing so would help us to make progress on all of them together: can we say anything general about explanations of modes of thought which enables us to say when the mode of thought will survive awareness of the explanation and when it won’t? Though the collection didn't make much impact at the time, I suspect these questions will come back into fashion – certainly I hope to return to them myself.
龚鹏程
龚鹏程，1956年生于台北，台湾师范大学博士，当代著名学者和思想家。著作已出版一百九十多种。 办有大学、出版社、杂志社、书院等，并规划城市建设、主题园区等多处。讲学于世界各地。并在北京、上海、杭州、台北、巴黎、日本、澳门等地举办过书法展。现为美国龚鹏程基金会主席、《龚鹏程国际学刊》出版人。
来源：龚鹏程大讲堂（公众号）
编辑：张家乐
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